Incentives for DB plans
We agree with both parts of the analysis, namely that DB plans are preferable to DC, and that there is currently a lack of incentives for DB plans. We strongly disagree however with Mr Dodge's opposition to fair value accounting. He claims, essentially, that we are not interested in today's values, but in expected values far into the future. We think that analysts of pensions are very much interested in today's values. For one, every expected future value can be discounted to a current present value (assuming that the term structure holds). Thus, Mr Dodge's distinction would essentially become moot.
More importantly however, it is not at all clear at which specific point "far into the future" the expected value would need to be formed - surely that cannot be discretionary? How about changes to those expected future values, based on variations of underlying assumptions? Finally, the volatility introduced to sponsors' balance sheets is not artificial, it's an economic fact. Cognition of that fact is a prerequisite of sponsors' ability to manage the inherent economic risk of their DB plans and, therefore, an enabler of an effective defined-benefit pension system.